IJI order not only to prove but also to discover this rule, I put x for what the chance* is worth to me. Hence having x I must be able to arrive at the same chance by an equitable game. Let it be the game which I play against another with stake x, where the other is also staking x; and let it be agreed that the one who wins shall give a to the one who loses. This game is equitable, and it appears that by this I have an equal chance to win a, that is, even if I lose the game, or 2x-a if I win, because then I get the stakes 2x from which I must give the other a. Suppose that 2x-a were as much as b, then I would have the same chance for a and b.
So I put 2x-a = b, and it follows that x= (a+b)/2 for the value of my chance. The proof of this is easy, because having (a+b)/2, I can venture against another who will also stake (a+b)/2, with the stipulation that the one who wins the game shall give a to the other. Therefore I will have an equal chance to get a, that is to say if I lose, or b if I win, because then I take a + b, which is the stake, and from this I give him a. In numbers:
if I have the same chance to get 3 or 7, then by this proposition my chance* is worth 5; and it is certain that having 5, I can arrive again at the same chance*.
Because venturing the 5 against another who is staking 5 against it with the stipulation that the one who wins will give 3 to the other is an equitable game, and it appears that I have the same chance to get 3, that is, if I lose, or 7 if I win, because then I take 10 from which I give him 3.
II. PROPOSITION.
If I have an equal chance to get a or b or c, it is worth as much to me as though I had (a+b+c)/3.
In order to discover it again, let x be put for the value of my chance as before.
Then having x, I must be able to arrive at the same chance* by an equitable game. Let it be the game that I play against two others, while all three of us stake x, and let me agree with one of them that if he wins the game, he shall give me b, and that I shall III. PROPOSITION. If the number of chances I have for a is p, and the number of chances I have b is q, then assuming that every chance can happen as easily, it is worth to me as much as (pa + @J/p + q.
COMMENTS

In Proposition
II is looks as if the same thing is proved twice.
However, Huygens' procedure, as he explicitly says, is first to discover the unknown value of the chance and then to prove it--the same procedure followed in solving equations: first deriving the value of the unknown by transforming the equation, and afterward verifying it. 2.2 "Chance" in the preceding text is the translation of kansse at the places indicated by an asterisk, and of kans in the other places.
In Proposition III "chances" is the translation of kanssen, which linguistically may be the plural of both of them.
2.3. "Chance" as occurring in my translation has a threefold meaning:
(a) It means the whole gambling situation, or more precisely the pay-off table of the game or as I put it elsewhere, the catalogue of what the player may expect when playing the game.
(b) It appears in the context "equal chance"; (c) It appears in the context "number of chances" (see Proposition III).
Huygens' problem is to determine the "value" of chance (a). Huygens seems to be inclined to use chance* in the sense of chance (a) and chance (without asterisk) in the sense of chance (b), though the use is not consequential.
In no case is chance* ever used in the sense of chance (b). Van 
